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FEDERAL FALSE STATEMENT
PROSECUTIONS: THE ABSURD BECOMES
MATERIAL
United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Wells,' the United States Supreme Court
held that materiality is not an element of the offense of making
a false statement to a federally insured bank.2 The Court con-
cluded that, under a natural reading of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, mate-
riality is not an express element of the offense. The Court
further reasoned that the phraseology of the statute conveys no
implicit meaning, which the Court believed is confirmed by the
legislative history of § 1014.4 According to the Court, there is no
need for a materiality requirement because no one would make
an immaterial false statement to a bank.5
This Note argues that the Court erred in holding that §
1014 contains no materiality requirement.6 First, this Note as-
serts that the Court, in allowing a vast spectrum of immaterial
false statements to be criminalized, failed to adhere to the "ab-
surd result principle,7 of statutory interpretation. Second, this
Note contends that the Court misinterpreted and misapplied
cases analyzing several predecessor statutes of § 1014.8 As a re-
sult, the Supreme Court incorrectly held that materiality is not
an element of the offense of making a false statement to a fed-
erally insured bank.
'117 S. Ct. 921 (1997).
2 Id. at 923.
' Id. at 927. See infra Section IV.4.
Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 928.
' Id at 931.
6 Id. at 923.
7 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819). See also infra Section V.A.
a See, e.g., Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938); McClanahan v. United States, 12
F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1926); United States v. Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1935).
See also infra Section V.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1014
1. Cases Examining § 1014's Predecessor Statutes
The predecessor statutes of 18 U.S.C. § 10149 were designed
to prevent banking fraud in a wide variety of contexts." The
first reported case involving a false statement made to a feder-
ally insured lending institution was McClanahan v. United States,"
where the defendant was convicted of violating § 31 of the Fed-
eral Farm Loan Act." Meade McClanahan had applied for a
loan using an application form supplied by the Federal Farm
Loan Board, which was designed to elicit information to deter-
mine the advisability of making a loan to the applicant.1
3
McClanahan provided false information in response to several
of the queries on the application. 4 On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit, McClanahan argued that the statute criminalized any
false statement, however immaterial or unrelated such state-
ment was to the transaction, and was therefore unconstitution-
ally broad. 5  He based his materiality argument on the
contention that Congress did not have the constitutional power
to criminalize "merely immoral" actions. 6 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Seventh Circuit determined that the application form
had been designed to require an applicant to provide only in-
9 18 U.S.C. § 1014 reads in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or report.., for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action [of a federally insured bank] u pon any applica-
tion, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement,
commitment, or loan.., shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned
not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996).
'" There is a marked dearth of reported cases involving § 1014 or its predecessor
statutes. The predecessor statutes served roughly the same purpose as 18 U.S.C. §
1001, which criminalizes fraud perpetrated against the United States government, its
agencies and its departments. See, e.g., Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
" 12 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1926).
1'2 Section 31 of the Federal Farm Loan Act read in pertinent part: "Any applicant
for a loan under this act, who shall knowingly make a false statement in his applica-
tion for such loan.., shall be punished .... " 12 U.S.C. § 981 (1926).
" McClanahan, 12 F.2d at 264.
14 Id.




formation material to the determination of the applicant's eli-
gibility for a loan. The court therefore concluded that imma-
terial information does not provide the basis for a prosecution
under the Federal Farm Loan Act.18
In the second reported case involving a predecessor statute
of § 1014, United States v. Kreidler,9 the defendant was indicted
for making a false statement to the Home Owners' Loan Corpo-
ration in violation of § 8 (a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of
1933.20 A. L. Kreidler challenged the validity of his indictment
on several grounds, including materiality.2' He claimed that a
false statement had to be "material and calculated to deceive" to
constitute an offense under § 8(a).22 As in McClanahan, the
Kreidler court determined that "a statement made to influence
the whim of some officer of the corporation... would not sup-
port the charge [of criminal wrongdoing] .,,23 Rather, the state-
ment "must be relevant and material. 24 The court concluded
that the false statements made by Kreidler were relevant to the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation's application process and
overruled Kreidler's demurrer to the indictment.2
Kay v. United States was perhaps the most important case in-
volving one of § 1014's predecessor statutes.2 6 Gertrude Kay was
convicted of violating the antifraud provisions of the Home
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 11 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1935).
20 Section 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 provided that:
[w]hoever makes any statement, knowing it to be false, or whoever willfully over-
values any security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation of the Board or an association upon any ap-
plication, advance, discount, purchase, or repurchase agreement, or loan, under
this Act, or any extension thereof by renewal deferment, or action or otherwise,
or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both.
12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) (1934).





26 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
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Owners' Loan Act of 1933.27 Kay overstated by two to four times
her claims against a second mortgage." Kay argued that be-
cause the Home Owners' Loan Corporation never approved or
made a loan to her, her false statement was irrelevant, and she
therefore could not be convicted of violating the Act.2 The Su-
preme Court disagreed: making a false statement with the inten-
tion of deceiving the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is a
criminal act, regardless of the Corporation's ultimate decision
whether to grant the loan.3 0 The Court thus held that reliance is
irrelevant in a § 8 (a) prosecution.
2. The Creation of § 1014 in 1948
As part of its reorganization of the federal criminal code in
1948, Congress consolidated thirteen statutes criminalizing false
statements made to federally insured lending institutions,
thereby creating § 1014. Ten of the predecessor statutes did
not contain a materiality requirement,33 while three explicitly
2' Id. at 3. See supra note 20 for the text of § 8(a) of the Home Owners' Loan Act.
Kay also appealed her conviction for violating § 8(e) of the Home Owners' Loan Act,
but those arguments are not material to this Note.
28 Kay, 303 U.S. at 5.
29 Id
" Id. at 5-6. As the Court explained:
It does not lie with one knowingly making false statements with intent to mislead
the officials of the Corporation to say that the statements were not influential or
the information not important .... Whether or not the Corporation would act




32 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
'3 See7 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false...
for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U.S.C. § 981 (1946) ("knowingly mak[ing] any
false statement in an application for a loan"); 12 U.S.C. § 1122 (1946) ("mak[ing] any
statement, knowing it to be false, for the purpose of obtaining.., any advance"); 12
U.S.C. 1123 (1946) ("willfully overvalu[ing] any property offered as security"); 12
U.S.C. §1248 (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement.., knowing the same to be false"); 12
U.S.C. § 1312 (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it to be false, for the pur-
pose of obtaining"); 12 U.S.C. § 1313 (1946) ("willfully overvalu[ing] any property of-
fered as security"); 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement, knowing it
to be false ... for the purpose of influencing"); 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a) (1946) (same);
15 U.S.C. § 616(a) (1946) ("mak[ing] any statement knowing it to be false.., for the
purpose of obtaining... or for the purpose of influencing").
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criminalized only material false statements.' The new section
authorized the prosecution of "[w] hoever knowingly makes any
false statement or report.., for the purpose of influencing in
any way the action of [a federally insured lending institution]
upon any application, advance, discount, purchase agreement,
repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan."35 Those con-
victed could be fined "not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both. 3 6 Although all thirteen predeces-
sor statutes contained different punishment provisions, the pun-
ishment prescribed by § 1014 was deemed "adequate for the
offenses described" by the statute. 7 The consolidated statute
contained "changes ... in phraseology to secure uniformity of
style, and some rephrasing was necessary, but.., was without
change of substance," except for changes in provisions relating
to punishment3 Section 1014 did not contain an explicit mate-
riality requirement, nor was materiality mentioned in the Re-
viser's Note.
3. Cases Examining § 1014
In the fifty years since the consolidation, virtually every cir-
cuit that examined § 1014 prior to Wells held that materiality is
an implicit element of the offense. Only the Second Circuit
has refused to recognize an implicit materiality requirement in
the statute.4 ' The rationale for implying a materiality require-
ment was that "otherwise the statute would punish harmless at-
tempts-that is, the making of a false statement incapable of
influencing a bank-and this would greatly expand the poten-
See 7 U.S.C. § 1026(a) (1946) (making a "material representation"); 12 U.S.C. §
596 (1946) (making a "material statement"); 12 U.S.C. § 1138d(a) (1946) (making a
"material representation").
"18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1948).
"Section 1014 has since been amended to allow fines of up to $1,000,000, impris-
onment for not more than 30 years, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996).
"See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
'9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
'0 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 71 F.3d 954 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Spears, 49 F.3d 1136 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Staniforth, 971 F.2d 1355 (7th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Ryan, 828 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Thompson, 811 F.2d 841 (5th
Cir. 1987); Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Bonnette, 663 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1981).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 565 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977).
1998]
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tial reach of the statute, with few benefits that we can see. '0
The circuits that implied a materiality element considered a
statement to be material if it had the capacity to influence a
bank or lending institution when evaluating a loan application.43
Courts thus clearly saw an implicit materiality requirement as a
necessary element of the false statement offense.
Prior to Wells, the United States Supreme Court examined
the offense elements of § 1014 in only one other case." Williams
v. United States involved a complicated check-kiting scheme and
presented the Court with the issue of whether passing a bad
check constitutes a "false statement" within the context of §
1014.45 In answering that question in the negative, the Court
defined two "propositions" that the Government must establish
in order to convict a person for violating § 1014:46 (1) the Gov-
ernment must demonstrate that the defendant made a "false
statement or report, [or] willfully overvalue[d] any land, prop-
erty or security;, 47 and (2) the Government must establish that
the defendant did so "for the purpose of influencing in any way
the action of [a described financial institution] upon any appli-
cation, advance,... commitment, or loan."4 8 Because there was
no question that the checks were material to the allegations, the
Court did not include proving the materiality of the false state-
ments among the required propositions. 49 The Government ar-
gued that a bad check should fall within the definition of "false
statement."0 The Court disagreed, noting that the Govern-
ment's interpretation of § 1014 "would make a surprisingly
broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal
law.""' Indeed, "any check, knowingly supported by insufficient
funds, deposited in a federally insured bank could give rise to
criminal liability., 52 The Court concluded that Congress did not
intend for § 1014 to amount to a national bad check law and de-
42 Staniforth, 971 F.2d at 1358.
"United States v. Goberman, 458 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 1972).
"See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
"See id. at 280.
16 id. at 284.
17 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
"See id. at 284-87.
'0 Id. at 285-86.
s Iat
-12 Id at 286.
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termined that a check drawn on insufficient funds is outside the
conduct criminalized by § 1014.s
B. THE ABSURD RESULT PRINCIPLE
Courts generally interpret statutes according to their plain
meaning, because the words chosen by a legislature are the
most persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute,5 4 There
are instances, however, in which reliance upon the plain mean-
ing of the words leads to absurd or frivolous results.5 5 The ab-
surd result principle provides judges with an exception to the
normal rules of statutory interpretation. 6 Under this principle
of statutory construction, judges need not apply the plain mean-
ing of a statute if such an application would lead to "patently ab-
surd consequences" that Congress clearly did not intend.57 Such
a "narrow exception" "does not intrude upon the lawmaking
powers of [the legislature], but rather demonstrates respect for
the coequal Legislative Branch, which [courts] assume would
not act in an absurd way."5s The principle is so widely accepted
among jurists that even strict literalists acknowledge that there
are instances in which the plain meaning of a statute cannot
control ajudicial decision. 9
The absurd result principle has a long history in the United
States, first appearing in 1819.60 In Sturges v. Crowninshield, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that in some instances a literal
interpretation of a statute is extreme and requires a more leni-
ent construction. 61 In United States v. Kirby, the Court first in-
53 Id. at 287.
5' SeeUnited States v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940).
5' Id. at 543.
Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd
Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 127-28 (1994).
'7 Public Citizen v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (Ken-
nedyJ., concurring) (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948)).
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
60 SeeSturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819).
' Id. at 202-03. The Court first enunciated the absurd result principle when it
stated:
(I]f, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other
provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the
framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in
which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be
19981
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voked the principle to strike down a criminal conviction.62 Kirby
was one of several defendants charged with violating a federal
statute which criminalized knowingly and willfully obstructing
the passage of mail.6' The conviction stemmed from an incident
in which Kirby, the county sheriff, arrested the local mail car-
rier, who had been indicted on a murder charge, while the lat-
ter was engaged in his official duties. 64 The Court determined
that the law should not be applied against Kirby because:
All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be
so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or
an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the
legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid re-
sults of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail
over its letter. 5
The Court determined that common sense dictated that Con-
gress did not intend for the statute to apply in this situation and
reversed Kirby's conviction.6
In more recent years, the absurd result principle has been
used infrequently but consistently.67 A notable recent examina-
tion of the principle occurred in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., where the Court considered the applicability of Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(a)6 in a civil proceeding.6 The majority,
noting that the rule's plain language compels an "unfathom-
able" result in a civil case, held that Federal Rule of Evidence
so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the
application.
Id.
62 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868).
63 Id. at 484.
64 Id.
Id at 486-87.66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440
(1989); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
At the time of Green, Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (a) provided that:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EVID. 609 (a) (1989). Rule 609 (a) was subsequently amended to remedy the
problem identified in Green. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1997).
69 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
[Vol. 88884
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609 (a) applies only in criminal actions.F Justice Scalia, in his
concurring opinion, wrote that looking at the potential "bizarre
disposition" of the case was sufficient for the Court to determine
that Rule 609 (a) did not apply in a civil action.7' It is thus ac-
cepted practice for the Court to look at the potential result of a
natural reading of a statute and to reach a different conclusion
if such a reading of the statute's text would be absurd.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jerry Wells and Kenneth Steele had a history of participat-
ing together in business ventures.72 In early 1986, the owner of
Doss Office Systems, Inc. (Doss), a lessor and servicer of photo-
copy machines, approached Wells and Steele and offered to sell
them the company.73 Because neither Wells nor Steele had any
knowledge of the copier leasing and servicing business, they
asked Jim Russell, Doss's then-vice president of sales, to join in
the venture.74 Russell agreed, and in May of 1986, the three
men assumed control of Doss, which they renamed Copytech
Systems, Inc. (Copytech).75 Russell assumed control of most of'
the day-to-day operations of Copytech; Wells and Steele later
became involved in those functions only after Russell began ex-
periencing emotional problems.75
From the outset, Copytech had severe financial difficulties
that required prompt attention.77 Copytech had a serious cash
flow problem, as well as more than $8 million in outstanding
debts.78 In order to obtain the cash necessary to keep Copytech
afloat, the new owners assigned Copytech's rights to anticipated
income from equipment lease payments to banks in exchange
for a lump sum payment.79 Some of Copytech's lease agree-
ments were Copier Management Program (CMP) leases, under
70 Id. at 510-11.
" Id. at 527 (Scalia,J., concurring).
7 United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 747 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 747.
7" Brief for Respondents at 3, United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997) (No. 95-
1228).
Wells, 63 F.3d at 747.
76 Brief for Respondents at 3, Wells (No. 95-1228).
Wells, 63 F.3d at 747.
78 Id.
Id. The lump sum payment was equal to the present value of the income stream
of a 60 month copier lease, discounted to yield the bank a 13-15% profit. Id.
1998] 885
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which the lease fees were calculated to include both the fixed
costs of the equipment and the variable, or "soft," costs of servic-
ing the equipment.s When Copytech sold its income interest in
a CMP lease to a bank, Copytech retained the obligation to pay
the "soft" costs incurred under those leases.' In some instances,
Wells, Steele and Russell, along with their spouses, had to sign
personal loan guarantees to cover those costs. 2
Copytech's financial difficulties were exacerbated by the
state of its relations with several banks in the Kansas City, Mis-
souri, area.83 For example, to protect itself against potential de-
fault by Copytech, Boatmen's Bank of Kansas City required
Copytech to maintain a cash reserve account equal to 15% of
the value of all of Copytech's outstanding leases, approximately
$500,000.84 Late in 1986, after Copytech overdrew on its ac-
count at the First State Bank of Joplin (First State Bank), the
company ended its relationship with Boatmen's Bank and con-
solidated all of its accounts at First State Bank.m This freed
$500,000 to cover the overdrafts, as well as other expenses, be-
cause First State Bank did not require Copytech to maintain a
cash reserve account.as A third bank, Norwest Bank, also offered
in 1986-87 to purchase CMP contracts from Copytech, but de-
manded that Copytech keep a reserve account similar to the
closed account at Boatmen's Bank. 7 Copytech did not want to
lose its limited financial flexibility by tying up significant
amounts of money in a reserve account and consequently de-
clined Norwest's offer.88
Copytech's cash flow difficulties persisted despite the com-
pany's financial maneuvering."' In an effort to obtain cash for
Copytech, and to avoid having to tie up cash in a reserve ac-
count, the owners of Copytech misrepresented to banks their
80 Id. "Soft" costs were the expenses related to using copiers, other than the
monthly rental fee, such as maintenance and replacement parts. Id
81 Id.
82 Brief for Respondents at 4, Wells (No. 95-1228).
Wells, 63 F.Sd at 747-48.







various service commitments.9° Copytech drafted new CMP
lease agreements that gave the lessees responsibility for the up-
keep of the leased equipment.91 The revised CMP contracts
were signed in conjunction with separate service addenda,
which shifted maintenance responsibilities back to Copytech.92
The company then sent the CMP leases to its funding sources
without enclosing the service addenda, thereby concealing
Copytech's service and maintenance obligations.93 Having no
direct knowledge of Copytech's ongoing service commitments,
the banks continued to fund Copytech without requiring the
company to maintain cash reserve accounts.94 At the same time,
however, the banks knew that Copytech's relationships with its
customers involved more than just the equipment leases be-
cause CMP customers paid the lease and service contract fees to
the banks in one monthly payment." Any money over and
above the monthly lease payment fee received by the banks was
deposited into Copytech's accounts.9
After discovering this scheme, the Government indicted
Wells and Steele9 7 on one count each of conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 371,98 alleging the two men had conspired to make ma-
terial false statements to banks by omitting any reference to the
CMP service addenda in their communications with the banks.9
The Government also charged Wells and Steele with four counts




" Brief for Respondents at 6, Wells (No. 95-1228).
96id.
97 Russell entered into a plea agreement with the Government before trial and tes-
tified against Wells and Steele. See Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, United States v. Wells,
117 S. Ct. 921 (1997) (No. 95-1228).
"18 U.S.C. § 371 reads in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1997).
"Wells, 63 F.3d at 748.
1998]
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.10° Before trial, the district court
judge dismissed one material false statement count for failure to
state an offense.'01 At the close of evidence at trial, the judge
ordered acquittal on two more of these counts. 0 2 The final re-
maining counts alleged that Wells and Steele made false state-
ments to O'Bannon Bank by forging their wives' signatures on
unconditional personal loan guarantees.
03
In their own defense, Wells and Steele asserted that omis-
sion of information cannot be a false statement, that the infor-
mation was not technically "false" because it was literally true,
and that withholding the CMP service addenda from the banks
was not material.0 4 As to the false statement charge, Wells and
Steele admitted they had forged their wives' signatures but
claimed to have done so with the authority, or at least a good
faith belief in their authority, to do so. 05
At the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury
that the elements of the offense of making a false statement to a
bank are: (1) that the bank was federally insured; (2) that the
defendants knowingly made, or caused to be made, a false
statement to the bank; and (3) that the defendants made that
false statement for the purpose of convincing the bank to pur-
chase lease contracts' 6 At the Government's request, and de-
spite defense objection, the court further instructed the jury
that withholding a material fact rendered a statement or repre-
sentation false, and defined a material fact as one "that would
be important to a reasonable person in deciding whether to en-
gage or not to engage in a particular transaction."0 7 The de-
fendants contended that materiality was an issue for the jury to
decide, while the Government argued that it was an issue for the
judge.'8  Following Eighth Circuit precedent,"' the judge
agreed with the Government and deemed the defendants'
'0' Brief for Respondents at 6, Wells (No. 95-1228). See supra note 9 for the perti-
nent text of§ 1014.
'o' Wells, 63 F.3d at 748.
102 Brief for Respondents at 3, Wells (No. 95-1228).
103 Id.
'04 Id. at 3, 5.
1o5 Wells, 63 F.3d at 748.
'0 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Wells (No. 95-1228).
107 United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 924 (1997).
108 Id.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Brimberry, 779 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
888 [Vol. 88
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statements material.110 The jury subsequently found Wells and
Steele each guilty of one count of conspiracy and one count of
making a false statement.' The court sentenced them both to
two years probation on each count, to run concurrently.
12
While the defendants' appeal to the Eighth Circuit was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided United States
v. Gaudin,"1 which held that when materiality is an element of
the offense, it is an issue for the jury to decide. 4 The Eighth
Circuit requested that the Government and Wells and Steele
submit supplemental briefs on the applicability of the Gaudin
ruling. 5 Wells and Steele argued that, pursuant to Gaudin, ma-
teriality is an element of § 1014 on which they were constitu-
tionally entitled to a jury's determination. 6 The Government
argued, for the first time, that materiality is not an element of
the offense as defined in § 1014."1 The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded, consistent with precedent, that materiality is an element
of § 1014,118 and therefore vacated the convictions, remanding
the case to the district court for a new trial."9
The Government appealed the Eighth Circuit decision, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari120 to decide whether ma-
teriality is an element of the crime of knowingly making a false
statement to a federally insured bank.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority in an 8-1 decision, 2' Justice Souter
vacated and remanded the Eighth Circuit's decision for further
I
"o Wells, 117 S. CL at 924.
III &d
" Brief for Respondents at 2, Wells (No. 95-1228).
"3 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
" Id. at 509.
"' Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 925.
116 id.
117 Id.
"8 United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 750-51 (8th Cir. 1995) (relying on United
States v. Ribaste, 905 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 753.
1"'United States v. Wells, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996).
2 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Gins-
burg and Breyerjoined injustice Souter's opinion.
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proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.12 As a thresh-
old matter, Justice Souter ruled that neither the Government's
initial indictment of Wells and Steele for making false and "ma-
terial" statements to a federally insured bank, nor the Govern-
ment's requested jury instructions regarding materiality at the
conclusion of the trial, precluded the Government from ques-
tioning (or the Court from addressing) the issue of whether ma-
teriality is an element of the offense. 2 Justice Souter then
determined that the materiality of a false statement or report
made to a federally insured bank is not an element under §
1014.124 Finally, Justice Souter dismissed as unavailing the de-
fendants' remaining arguments for affirming the Eighth Cir-
cuit's opinion.
1. The Court's Ability to Address the Issue of Materiality
Justice Souter ruled that the Court properly could address
whether materiality of falsehood is an element of the offense
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1014.126 Respondents Wells and Steele
advanced two arguments against the Court's determination of
whether materiality is an element of § 1014.12' First, they con-
tended that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30128 foreclosed
the Government's position on appeal that materiality is not an
element.'9 Justice Souter rejected this argument by noting that
the Government was not challenging the jury instruction in an
attempt to assign error to the trial court.130 Instead, the Gov-
ernment was asserting that its proposed instruction was "harm-
less surplusage," which had not affected the jury's
deliberations.
131
'22United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 932 (1997).
"2 Id. at 925-26.
12 Id. at 926-29.
'2 Id. at 929-32.
'2 Id. at 925-26.
'2' Brief for Respondents at 11, Wells (No. 95-1228).
'2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 reads, in pertinent part: "No party may
assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for his objection." FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 (1997).





Second, Wells and Steele advanced the "law of the case" 13 2
and "invited error"133 doctrines to support their claim that the
Court was precluded from addressing the materiality issue.
13
Justice Souter acknowledged that several appellate courts have
held that the "law of the case" doctrine prevents the Govern-
ment from denying on appeal that a crime includes an element
if the Government accepted instructions at trial which included
a fact as an element of the offense.' Justice Souter also noted
that the respondents were correct to assert that several appellate
courts do not allow parties to complain on appeal about errors
that the parties themselves invited or provoked the district court
to commit.Y6 However, Justice Souter determined that neither
of these doctrines is sufficient to overcome the Court's tradi-
tional rule of reviewing all issues presented in a petition for cer-
tiorari, so long as each issue is "'pressed [in] or passed on' by
the Court of Appeals.' 3 7 Because the Eighth Circuit addressed
the issue of a false statement's materiality as an element of §
1014, the Government was allowed to argue that issue before
the Court.' Furthermore, when the Government drafted its
indictment and jury instructions, it believed there was evidence
sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Circuit's materiality require-
ment.'3 9 Only after the Gaudin decision did the Government
have any reason to contest the need to demonstrate materiality;
if materiality was not an element of the offense, the entire issue
was moot.140 Justice Souter therefore concluded that the Gov-
ernment was not disqualified from arguing the materiality issue
before the Court.41
"2 According to justice Souter, under the law of the case doctrine, "when the Gov-
ernment accepts jury instructions treating a fact as an element of an offense, the...
doctrine precludes the Government from denying on appeal that the crime includes
the element." Id.
"' The "invited error" doctrine precludes a party from complaining on appeal
about errors that the party invited or provoked the district court to commit. Id. (cit-




"s Id. at 925-26 (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 42 (1992)).






2. The Materiality Issue
Having set forth the Court's authority to hear the issue, Jus-
tice Souter discussed whether materiality is an element of a vio-
lation of § 1014.142 First, Justice Souter looked to the text of §
1014,11 and noted that the language of the statute does not re-
quire the subject of the false statement or report to be material
to the application.4 4  Rather, § 1014 criminalizes any false
statement made to a federally insured bank. 45 Justice Souter
further noted that the term "false statement" in § 1014 carries
with it no "general suggestion of influential significance."4 6 Ac-
cordingly, Justice Souter determined that, under a natural read-
ing of the text of § 1014, materiality is not an element of the
crime of making false statements to a federally insured lending
institution. 7
Second, Justice Souter addressed the respondents' conten-
tion that "false statement" possesses a common law implication
of materiality which was incorporated into § 1014 upon codifica-
tion.48 Justice Souter acknowledged that some common law
crimes involving false statements contained a materiality ele-
ment." 9 Congress, however, codified those common law crimes
in other sections of the federal criminal code and explicitly in-
cluded materiality provisions5  Section 1014 itself consolidated
thirteen previous statutory provisions relating to making false
statements to financial institutions, which Congress did not in-
clude among the federal crimes containing a materiality ele-
ment.151 Justice Souter noted that, although "false statement"
and "misrepresentation" were similar at common law, and "mis-
representation" had been held to contain a materiality element,
142 Id.
"4 See supra note 9 for the pertinent text of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.
'41 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 927.





0 Id. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) ("[Wlhoever ... knowingly and willfully fal-
sifies, conceals or covers up... a material fact... ."); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) ("Who-
ever... willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to
be true .... ); 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1994) ("Whoever under oath ... makes any false ma-
terial declaration.. .").
"5! Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 927. See also supra Section IIA2.
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it does not necessarily follow that both terms are identical in
containing an implicit materiality requirement.5
Third, Justice Souter reviewed the statute's legislative history
and determined that Congress did not intend for § 1014 to con-
tain a materiality element.53 Only three of thirteen earlier stat-
utes aggregated in § 1014 had an express materiality
requirement, while ten of the earlier provisions had no such re-
quirement.' Justice Souter concluded that "[t]he most likely
inference in these circumstances is that Congress deliberately
dropped the term 'materiality' without intending materiality to
be an element of § 1014.",5 To reach this conclusion, Justice
Souter relied upon Kay v. United States, which examined one of
the predecessor statutes of § 1014.156 In Kay, the Court deter-
mined that it is irrelevant whether the statements made to a
bank actually would influence the bank's decision to make a
loan.57 Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the statements
are false and are intended to mislead the lending institution.15 8
Justice Souter interpreted Kay as holding that materiality is not
an implied element of the offense of making false statements to
a bank. 9 Because the Kay decision was announced a decade
before Congress consolidated the statute at issue in Kay with
twelve other statutes to create § 1014, Justice Souter assumed
that Congress intended § 1014 to be read in conformity with the
Court's decision in Kay.'0 Therefore, Justice Souter concluded
that it was unlikely Congress viewed a materiality requirement as
an implicit element of the § 1014 offense. 6'
3. The Respondents' Remaining Arguments
Finally, Justice Souter addressed the remaining arguments
advanced by Wells and Steele.' 62 In response to the respon-
dents' contention that congressional inaction essentially ratified
,12 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 927 n.10.
113 Id. at 928.
1 Id.
155 rdI
Id. at 928-29. See also supra Section II.A.1.
11
7 Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 5 (1938).
'Id. at 5-6.
9 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 928.
"0 Id. at 929.
161 Id.
112 Id. at 929-32.
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some appellate court holdings that materiality is an element of
§ 1014, Justice Souter warned that "finding any interpretive help
in congressional behavior here is impossible." 163 Although Con-
gress had not rejected those decisions when otherwise amend-
ing § 1014, it never disturbed the original phraseology of § 1014
specifically to include materiality.164 Justice Souter believed "'it
is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the
adoption of a controlling rule of law. ' '' 5 In the present circum-
stances, Justice Souter found the respondents' argument par-
ticularly unconvincing because judicial opinion was divided on
the issue of materiality.166 Furthermore, the Court had not de-
scribed materiality as an element of § 1014 when considering
the statute in earlier cases.167
Next, Justice Souter rejected the respondents' reliance on
the Reviser's Note to argue that § 1014 implicitly contains a ma-
teriality element.' 6 Justice Souter dismissed as "simply wrong"
the Reviser's assertion that Congress's consolidation of thirteen
statutory provisions into § 1014 "was without change of sub-
stance."' 69 Dropping the materiality requirement from the con-
solidated statute represented a significant change from three of
the predecessor statutes.170 Justice Souter based his conclusion
upon the respondents' failure to cite "a single case holding that
any of the predecessor statutes lacking a materiality require-
ment implicitly contained one," and Congress' inability to as-
sume an implicit materiality requirement in the wake of the
Court's decision in Kay.'
7
Third, Justice Souter denied the respondents' assertion that
materiality should be read into §1014 to avoid punishing rela-
163 Id. at 929.
164 id
163 I. (quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79, 404
U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971)).
166 Id. at 930.
167 Id.
1'6 Id. The Reviser's Note to § 1014 reads in pertinent part: "Each of the 13 sec-
tions from which this section was derived contained similar provisions either relating
to false representations and statements, or overvaluation of security, with respect to
one or more of the named banks, agencies, or corporations." 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Re-
viser's Note) (1994).
69 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 930 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994)).
,71 Id. See supra notes 32-39 for a discussion of the statutes consolidated into 18
U.S.C. § 1014 in 1948.
'7' Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 930.
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tively trivial or innocent conduct. 17 2 According to Justice Souter,
a statement made "for the purpose of influencing a bank" usu-
ally is not about something a banker would regard as inconse-
quential.173 Ordinarily, demonstrating that a particular state-
ment could influence a bank is crucial to showing that the false
statement was made with the subjective intent of influencing
that institution.74 Therefore, Justice Souter concluded, a literal
reading of § 1014 "will not normally take the scope of [the stat-
ute] beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would im-
pose. 175
Fourth, Justice Souter determined that the rule of lenity'
76
was "no help" to the respondents m177 Because Justice Souter al-
ready had determined that § 1014 contained no ambiguity,
there was no need to apply the rule of lenity.1 78
In light of these conclusions, Justice Souter vacated the
judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.'7
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
In his dissent, Justice Stevens discussed three flaws in the
majority's opinion.80 First, because the majority misinterpreted
the Kay opinion, the Court's reliance on that case was mis-





176 The rule of lenity states that where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute,
doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant. The Court explained the policies un-
derlying this rule in United States v. Bass
(A] mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in fa-
vor of lenity... [Tiwo policies... have long been part of our tradition. First,
.a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make
the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." Second, because of
the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not
courts should define criminal activity.
404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (citations omitted).
'7 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 931.
178 Id.
179 Id.
'" Id. at 932 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'8 Id (Stevens,J., dissenting). See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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fronted the question of materiality, because the false statements
made by Ms. Kay were unquestionably material.'82 Instead, the
Kay Court addressed the difference between the concepts of
materiality (whether the information could have played a role
in the loan approval process) and reliance (whether the infor-
mation did play a role in the process), and held that all material
misstatements relied upon by the deceived decision-maker were
criminal under the predecessor statute to § 1014.183 Thus, Jus-
tice Stevens argued, the majority read the Kay decision too ex-
pansively.'84  Because Kay was not directly on point, Justice
Stevens reasoned, it was of no use in determining the proper
scope of § 1014.ss
Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice Souter's interpre-
tation of the history of § 1014.186 Specifically, Justice Stevens be-
lieved the revisers of § 1014 were correct in asserting that there
had been no change of substance when Congress created §
1014287 Citing two pre-consolidation cases which held or as-
sumed that the nonexplicit § 1014 predecessor statutes con-
tained materiality requirements,ss Justice Stevens argued that
the revisers reasonably could have assumed that the newly codi-
fied § 1014 implicitly contained a materiality element.'9 In
support of his conclusion that the revisers' omission of an ex-
press reference to materiality was not a "change of substance,"
Justice Stevens enumerated three additional points: (1) the
common law assumed a materiality requirement in crimes in-
volving false statements, which the Court has previously recog-
nized;' 90 (2) it is "farfetched" that Congress made a deliberate
decision to include or to omit a materiality requirement every
... Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 932 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'"Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 933 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 932 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'
TMId. at 933 (Stevens.,J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that "a more plausible ex-
planation" was that "the reviser was, in fact, correct." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188 McClanahan v. United States, 12 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1935). See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying
text.
189 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 933-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
896 [Vol. 88
FALSE S TA TEMENT PROSECUTIONS
time it created a false statement offense; 9' and (3) because
courts had a different view of statutory interpretation in 1948, it
was reasonable for Congress and the revisers to assume that the
courts would continue to assume the existence of the materiality
requirement that had been a routine aspect of common law
false statement litigation.192
In closing, Justice Stevens characterized the Court's textual
analysis of § 1014 as unconvincing and overly broad.9 3 As a re-
sult, Justice Stevens argued that the majority expanded the
reach of §1014 well beyond its common law antecedents.)' Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, the Court's reasoning did not justify
the conclusion that Congress intended to make immaterial false
statements a felony.9 5
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court reached the wrong conclusion in United
States v. Wells for several reasons. First, the Court's interpreta-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 promotes absurd prosecutions, a result
Congress certainly did not intend and one that ignores an ac-
cepted cannon of statutory interpretation.'9 The Court implic-
itly addressed the interpretation issue in Williams, a case the
Court inadequately considered when deciding Wells19 7  Addi-
tionally, many of the assumptions upon which the Wells Court
relied are incorrect. The Kay98 decision does not offer the sup-
"' Id. at 936 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens considered it far more likely
that Congress assumed a materiality requirement would be implied wherever it was
not explicit. Id (Stevens,J, dissenting).
2 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, that the vast majority
of federal judges subsequently found an implicit materiality requirement in § 1014
confirmed this assumption. Id. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 937 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that the majority's interpre-
tation of § 1014 made a broad range of unremarkable conduct, such as disingenu-
ously flattering a bank officer about his choice of a bow tie, a violation of federal law.
Furthermore, the Court made unfounded empirical judgments that false statements
are usually not about trivial matters, and that the Government rarely would be able to
prove that nonmaterial statements were made for the purpose of influencing a deci-
sion. Id- (StevensJ., dissenting).
'Id. (StevensJ, dissenting).
See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
"' Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982). See supra notes 44-53 and ac-
companying text.
"s Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938). See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying
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port the Court attached to it. Furthermore, by not examining
the Kreidles9 and McClanahan° decisions, the Court overlooked
two cases which clearly demonstrate that federal courts rou-
tinely had implied a materiality element under two of § 1014's
predecessor statutes.
A. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE ABSURD RESULT
PRINCIPLE
1. Application of the Principle
Justice Souter erred in failing to look beyond the plain
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1014's language.2 Indeed, the American
Trucking decision directs a court to go further than the literal
words of a statute. °3 When construing a statute, a court also
must look to the potential result of that construction.20 4 If the
interpretation will lead to an absurd result, the court should
look to the purpose of the statute .2 Even if the result is not ab-
surd, but merely unreasonable, sometimes the court must ad-
here to the underlying purpose of a statute rather than the
literal words.2 6 Had Justice Souter followed precedent estab-
lished in American Trucking and its forebears, he undoubtedly
would have reached a more reasonable conclusion in Wells.
Furthermore, the Court may not pick and choose among its
precedents.0 7 The American Trucking decision clearly delineated
the path the Court should have followed when giving a statute a
natural reading. Because the Court did not follow precedent,
the result is a conclusion which can only be described as absurd.
9 United States v. Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1935). See supra notes 19-
25 and accompanying text.
McClanahan v. United States, 12 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1926). See supra notes 11-18
and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
202 United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 926-27 (1997). See also supra notes 122-79
and accompanying text.
2'0 United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
204See a
205 see id
See id The Court recognized this principle as early as 1819. See Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819).
2" The Court follows the principle of stare decis when deciding cases. As Justice
Brandeis explained, "Stare decsis is usually the wise policy," because "[t]he Court bows
to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning .... ." Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932) (BrandeisJ., dissenting).
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As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the Court's holding
leaves open the possibility that a trivial remark made during the
loan application process will result in a "draconian" punish-
ment.0 8 All lies intended to encourage a favorable outcome on
a loan application, including mere flattery, are now "punishable
by up to 30 years in prison, a fine of up to $1,000,000, 'or
both.'"20 For example, a homeowner who considers a bank loan
officer's bow tie ugly, yet nevertheless compliments him on his
good taste, is now criminally liable under § 1014.210 Justice Stev-
ens noted:
As now construed, § 1014 covers false explanations for arriving late at a
meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind if the loan of-
ficer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm about the results
of a football game or an election, as well as false compliments about the
subject of a family photograph. So long as the false statement is made
"for the purpose of influencing" a bank officer, it violates § 1014.2"
The only false statement count on which the defendants in
Wells ultimately were convicted alleged that Wells and Steele
had signed their wives' signature on personal loan guarantees.
The jury convicted the two men on that charge only after hear-
ing ajury instruction that such conduct was "material.213 Surely
Congress did not mean to equate such a common practice with
felonious conduct, particularly in a situation where the defen-
dants had a good faith belief in their authority to do so.214 Yet,
the Wells Court concluded that Congress meantjust that.215
In arriving at the conclusion that there is no materiality re-
quirement under § 1014, the Court ignored its own precedent
and misconstrued congressional intent. While Justice Souter
correctly stated that the Court had "previously described the
elements of § 1014 without any mention of materiality" in the
Williams case,1 6 he ignored the Court's strong reluctance to
criminalize trivial behavior.217 The Williams Court recognized
that making "a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable con-
United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 932 (1997) (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
210 See id at 936 n.14 (Stevens,J, dissenting); see also supra note 194.
2" Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 932-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2,2 United States v. Wells, 63 F.3d 745, 748 (8th Cir. 1995).
211 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 924.
2 Wes, 63 F.d at.748.
225 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 932 (StevensJ, dissenting).
2, Id. at 930.
2' Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1982).
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duct a violation of federal law" was not what Congress intended
when it promulgated § 1014.218 While a particular construction
might make sense in the context of a particular case, the Court
in Williams cautioned against such a construction if it would
have far-reaching implications. 219  The Williams decision thus
strongly contradicts the absurd result that the Court reached in
Wells. The Wells Court should have concluded that materiality
was a requirement under § 1014, thereby removing unremark-
able conduct from the scope of the statute.
2. Ramifications of the Wells Holding
The impact of the Wells decision extends far beyond future
§ 1014 prosecutions. At its most basic, the Court's holding in
Wells means that courts may not imply a materiality requirement
in any federal false statement statute that lacks an explicit mate-
riality requirement.220  Some of these false statement statutes
clearly do not call for a materiality requirement, because there
would be no opportunity for a person to supply immaterial false
information.2 For example, it is a crime to willfully and know-
ingly make a false statement in a passport application.22 2 Citi-
zens may apply for a passport only by completing a specific
application form, which requires the applicant to provide a wide
range of personal information all of which is material to the de-
termination that the applicant is a United States citizen entitled
to a passport.223 Therefore, there is no need for this statute to
contain an explicit materiality requirement.
224
On the other hand, § 1014 provides an unusually outra-
geous example of the types of immaterial behavior that are now
federal offenses.2 Other false statement statutes may be simi-
larly sweeping if interpreted as broadly as § 1014 was in Wells.
218 Id. at 286.
219 See id. at 286-87.
220 See Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 929 (holding that when interpreting a statute, congres-
sional silence should not be construed as adoption of a controlling rule of law).
... See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (1994) (providing in pertinent part "[w]hoever will-
fully and knowingly makes any false statement in an application for passport...





SSee supra text accompanying note 211.
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For example, a dairy company that advertises its milk products
as "creamy and delicious" is now federally criminally liable if
through an objective determination that claim is proven to be
false.226 In another example, a person applying for workers'
compensation benefits who makes a false statement may be held
criminally liable, regardless of the relevancy of his statement.
227
Neither of these provisions contains an explicit materiality re-
quirement. Yet, as a result of the Court's decision in Wells, such
statements are now federal criminal offenses because courts may
not read a materiality requirement into a statute that lacks such
a requirement. The number of false statement crimes has
grown exponentially, and now includes virtually every statement
imaginable in the context of transactions governed by these
anti-fraud provisions. It is highly unlikely that Congress in-
tended all such behavior to constitute a crime. 28
Justice Souter did not seriously address the consequence
that absurd cases might be prosecuted under the Court's expan-
sive reading of § 1014.2 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that a
literal reading of the statute would not take § 1014 beyond the
scope that a materiality requirement would impose.20 Unfortu-
nately that is not true: A literal application of § 1014 would
authorize the prosecution of false statements that are not mate-
rial.2' In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Court, quite
correctly, did not rely upon the discretion of prosecutors to
avoid frivolous prosecutions.232 Rather than offering a realistic
or compelling means of ensuring that absurd cases will not be
prosecuted, however, the Court "made an empirical judgment
that false statements will not 'usually' be about a trivial mat-
ter., 233 The Court did not address those apparently rare in-
stances in which an immaterial false statement was made for the
See7 U.S.C. § 6407(e) (1994) (barring "false or unwarranted statements" regard-
ing fluid milk products).
See 33 U.S.C. § 931 (1994) (penalizing false statements for purpose of obtaining
workers' compensation benefit).
's United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 938 (1997) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
'9 See id. at 931.
2M Id.
2" See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1996).




purpose of influencing a decision. 4 The easiest solution for the
Court would have been to impose a materiality requirement.
B. THE COURT MISINTERPRETED PRECEDENTS
1. Kay v. United States Did Not Address the Materiality Issue.
Contrary to Justice Souter's conclusion, the Supreme
Court's decision in Kay v. United States2 does not preclude a de-
termination that there is an implied materiality element in §
1014 for two reasons. First, the Kay Court did not address
whether materiality was an implicit element of the offense of
making false statements under the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1467(a) .237 Instead, the Court determined that provid-
ing false information to a bank is a crime regardless of whether
the bank ultimately relies upon that false information to make
its decision on a loan application2 8 While the Court correctly
presumed that Congress follows Supreme Court holdings,29 the
Court incorrectly concluded that, because of the Kay decision,
"Congress could not... assume[] that a materiality element was
implicit in a comparable statute that was silent on the issue."240
Because the Court did not directly address materiality in Kay,
Congress had no reason to believe that courts would not con-
tinue to imply an absent materiality requirement in the newly-
created § 1014. Kay, therefore, does not stand in the way of a
conclusion that Congress deemed an express materiality re-
quirement as redundant.
Second, although the Wells Court stated that "no one read-
ing Kay could reasonably have assumed that criminal falsity pre-
supposed materiality,"24 the Kay Court did, in fact, presuppose
materiality when it examined a violation of the Home Owners'
Loan Act.24 2 The materiality of the false statements at issue in
Id& at 931.
2" Id. at 929.
303 U.S. 1 (1938). See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
27 Kay, 303 U.S. at 5. In Kay there was no dispute about the materiality of the false
statements made by the defendant.
M Id.
29 See, e.g., North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995).
210 Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 930.
1 Id. at 929.
21 Kay, 303 U.S. at 5. See also supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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Kay was recognized by both sides. 3 The Kay Court implied that
no one would make an unimportant false statement to a bank,
and therefore all false statements are material.2 4 4 While that im-
plication seems somewhat overstated, it is nevertheless true that
Kay can be construed to mean that the court would only enter-
tain prosecutions under the Home Owners' Loan Act that in-
volved material false statements. 24 Therefore, it was wrong for
Justice Souter to cite Kay as support for the proposition that a
materiality requirement must be explicit, when the Kay decision
itself implies that only material false statements were illegal un-
der one of § 1014's predecessor statutes.
2. The Court Incorrectly Ignored its Decisions
in McClanahan and Kreidler
The Reviser Note to § 1014 concludes that "[t]he consolida-
tion [of the thirteen predecessor statutes] was without change
of substance.... 4  Although Justice Souter characterized that
conclusion as "simply wrong," 247 the history of § 1014's predeces-
sor statutes is not so simple. Given the lack of an express mate-
riality requirement in § 1014, and the history of courts implying
such an element, there can be no doubt that the Reviser's Note
is correct and Congress intended for a materiality element to be
implied in § 1014.4
Justice Souter summarily rejected Justice Stevens's notion
that McClanahan v. United State 49 and United States v. Kreidler 0
offer compelling insight into the implied materiality require-
ments of two of § 1014's predecessors.2' Justice Souter argued
that because neither case specifically held that materiality is an
implied element of those statutes, the two cases were irrelevant
to a discussion of § 1014.22 Far more telling than the holdings
themselves, however, is the cavalier attitude toward materiality
24Kay, 303 U.S. at 5.
" l& at 6.
2 See id.
216 See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
247 United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 930 (1997).
248 See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
2'9 12 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1926).
11 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1935).




taken by the Kreidler and McClanahan courts.253 Both courts sim-
ply assumed that prosecutions under false statement statutes
would proceed only in instances where the allegedly false state-
ments were material to the loan application.2 The Kreidler
court assumed that an immaterial false statement would be in-
sufficient to support a charge of violating the statute." The
McClanahan court did not address the materiality issue because
there was no doubt that the false statements made by the defen-
dant were material. 6 The McClanahan court did, however, de-
termine that if "the false statements charged and proved were
wholly frivolous and unrelated, it would in all probability be
concluded that that they did not supply the basis for a prosecu-
tion" under the statute at issue.25 The Kreidler and McClanahan
decisions thus clearly demonstrate that courtg were routinely
implying a materiality element under predecessors to § 1014.
More importantly, however, these cases make insupportable
several of the propositions advanced by the Wells Court. The
Kreidler and McClanahan decisions directly rebutJustice Souter's
contention that Congress could not have assumed that a materi-
ality element is implied in a statute silent on the issue. 8 Fur-
thermore, the Kay decision did not preclude Congress from
assuming that a materiality element is implicit.25 9 In fact, Con-
gress could have assumed the exact opposite: there is no need
for an explicit materiality requirement because courts routinely
260imply such an element when addressing false statement cases.
Because courts implied a materiality element in predecessor
statutes, it was wholly proper for the Reviser of § 1014 to regard
the consolidation of thirteen statutes into one statute without an
express materiality provision as a "consolidation without change
of substance."26' That the implied materiality elements in
Kreidler and McClanahan were not appealed lends credence to
the theory that implication of a materiality element was a widely
's See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text.
24 See McClanahan, 12 F.2d at 264; Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. at 403; see also supra notes
11-25 and accompanying text.
" Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. at 403.
216 McClanahan, 12 F.2d at 264.
257id.
United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 930 (1997).
' See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
o See, e.g., McClanahan, 12 F.2d at 264; Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. at 403.
26, See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Reviser's Note) (1994).
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accepted practice before the 1948 consolidation.62 Kreidler and
McClanahan thus refute the Court's assertion that the Reviser
was wrong, and therefore deprive Justice Souter of one of his
most important arguments.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Wells, the Supreme Court incorrectly de-
termined that materiality is not an element of the offense of
making a false statement to a federally insured bank. First, the
Court should have invoked the absurd result principle to draw a
distinct boundary between criminal and non-criminal behavior.
The Court should have taken a results-oriented approach to the
decision and recognized that its holding has the effect of feder-
ally criminalizing trivial behavior. The Court could have
avoided this problem only by concluding that materiality was an
implicit element of the offense. Furthermore, the Court should
have examined its precedents and the history of 18 U.S.C. §
1014 to determine that materiality was routinely assumed to be
an element of § 1014's predecessor statutes. As a result of the
Court's decision, inconsequential behavior is now punishable by
draconian penalties.
BRADFORD R. HISE
" McClanahan, 12 F.2d at 264; Kreidler, 11 F. Supp. at 403.
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